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ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE NEW
YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: REVISED
INTERPRETATION IN WAKE OF NEW
FEDERAL STANDARDS?
In language identical to that of the fourth amendment, section
12 of Article I of the New York State Constitution specifically
proscribes "unreasonable searches and seizures."1 For a search or
seizure to be reasonable and not violative of constitutional rights,
probable cause must exist. 2 Hearsay information may form the baI N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. New York's proscription against unreasonable search and seizure began as a "creature of
statute," section 8 of the Civil Rights Law, and in 1938 was incorporated into the New York
State Constitution. See People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 168, 51 N.E.2d 690,
693 (1943); People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926). Because the wording of the state provision duplicates verbatim the language of the fourth amendment, see
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, the New York courts have relied, with few exceptions, see infra note
44, upon both constitutional provisions to interpret search and seizure law. See People v.
Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 57, 432 N.E.2d 745, 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (1982)(Gabrielli, J.,
concurring); People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 236, 406 N.E.2d 471, 474, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655,
658 (1980); People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 696, 339 N.E.2d 182, 184, 376 N.Y.S.2d
497, 501 (1975). The constitutional provision "protects the privacy interests of the people of
our State, not only in their persons, but in their houses, papers and effects as well, against
the unfettered discretion of government officials to search or seize." Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 52,
432 N.E.2d at 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 874; see also People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90, 92, 341
N.E.2d 227, 229, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (1975)(both state and federal constitutions protect
citizens' privacy from unwarranted intrusion).
A "'search'. . . occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed" and a
"'seizure' occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 820, 822 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The divergent analysis afforded search and seizure actions with and without warrants is
discussed later herein. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. See also Comment,
The Aguilar-Spinelli Doctrine:In Requiem, 21 Hous. L. REv. 955, 958 & n.19 (1984)(probable cause varies with search arrest and warrant situation).
2 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)(seizures under fourth
amendment "reasonable" if based on probable cause); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949)(probable cause standards safeguard citizenry from unreasonable invasion of
privacy); see generally J. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 5.1-5.31 (1982 & Supp. 1985)
(discussing constitutional predicate of probable cause). The purpose of the probable cause
requirement is to protect the "innocent and guilty alike from search or arrest based upon
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sis for establishing probable cause 3 but must preliminarily satisfy a
suspicion or upon common rumor and report." Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d at 236, 406 N.E.2d at 474,
428 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
Although eluding precise definition, "probable cause" has been described as the reasonable belief, acquired from all the facts and circumstances known to the law enforcement
officer, that an offense occurred or that evidence of the offense is located in the place to be
searched. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175-76; Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d at 92, 341 N.E.2d at 229, 378
N.Y.S.2d at 662-63. Probable cause defies exact definition since it entails probabilities:
"These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175.
The quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause does not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; it is necessarily less strict than that required to prove the guilt of the
defendant at the criminal trial. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959);
People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1985);
People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 602, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 1019, 435 N.Y.S.2d 679, 683 (1980).
For a discussion of probable cause, see generally Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An
Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REv. 741 (1974).
Article 690 of the Criminal Procedure Law, codifying search warrant requirements in
New York law, typifies the probable cause prerequisite. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW §§ 690.10,
690.35(2)(b) (McKinney 1984)("reasonable cause" requirement); see also id. at § 690.10,
commentary at 366 ("reasonable cause" is New York's statutory equivalent of the probable
cause standard); id. at § 140.10(1)(a), (b) (reasonable cause requirement for warrantless
arrest).
3 As used herein, "hearsay" is discussed in the context of probable cause and not as the
term is denoted in the law of evidence. In evidence, hearsay signifies an out-of-court statement "offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting
for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (1972). Generally, hearsay is not admissible evidence in a trial, see
FED. R. EvID. 802, but the rule against hearsay contains numerous exceptions. See id. at 803,
804.
In the context of probable cause, hearsay is admissible in the application for a warrant.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 690.35(2)(c) (McKinney 1984). It is also admissible to determine probable cause in a warrantless arrest or search situation. See, e.g., Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d
at 241, 406 N.E.2d at 477, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 661 (with appropriate safeguards, hearsay informant provides probable cause in warrantless situation). In both cases the officer is testifying to information that is not based on personal observation, but relayed second-hand
through an informant. See People v. Petralia, 62 N.Y.2d 47, 51, 464 N.E.2d 424, 426, 476
N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (inter-police bulletin is hearsay information), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852
(1984); Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d at 91, 341 N.E.2d at 228, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (1975) (private citizen
supplied hearsay information for search warrant); People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 337,
229 N.E.2d 581, 583, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1967)(anonymous informant to provide basis for
police action), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 667 (1968). See also Comment, People v. Elwell: Hearsay Informants and Probable Cause, 47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 283, 288 (1980) (discussing
whether information supplied by informant may constitute probable cause).
The legality of hearsay as a predicate for probable cause originated with the Supreme
Court decision of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), which upheld a warrantless
arrest upon an informant's assertion and police corroboration. See id. at 310-12. The Court
rejected the notion that the foundation for police action must be evidence which would be
competent to prove guilt at a criminal trial. Id. at 311-12. The Supreme Court subsequently
stated that hearsay alone may form the basis for a warrant "so long as there was a substan-
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test of trustworthiness4 to abate any constitutional infringements.
Absent a finding of probable cause the illegally obtained evidence
may be excluded from the criminal trial.5 In a number of recent
decisions based on the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has
retracted some of the protections previously afforded the criminal
defendant by mitigating the substantive requirements for a probable cause determination based on hearsay and by modifying the
exclusionary rule. Recently, however, in People v. Johnson and
People v. Bigelow," the New York Court of Appeals declined to
adopt these new federal standards, thereby granting the criminal
defendant greater protection from police intrusion under the New
York Constitution.9
tial basis for crediting the hearsay." See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960);
see also People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 556, 330 N.E.2d 631, 635, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681
(1975) (hearsay information permitted if "substantial basis for crediting" it exists).
4 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Aguilar devised the two-prong test to determine whether the hearsay data was sufficiently trustworthy to establish probable cause:
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded
that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed ...was "credible" or his
information "reliable."
Id. at 114 (citation omitted). Information passing this test assured that probable cause
would be inferred by a magistrate from facts and would not represent a mere affirmation of
the officer's or informant's conclusory suspicions. See id. at 112-14. The test was bifurcated
into two distinct requirements: first, the "basis of knowledge" prong or the particular means
by which the informant acquired the information given in its report; and second, the "veracity" prong wherein the credibility of the informant or the reliability of the report is established. See People v. Rodriquez, 52 N.Y.2d 483, 488-89, 420 N.E.2d 946, 949, 438 N.Y.S.2d
754, 757 (1981); Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d at 237, 406 N.E.2d at 474, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 659; Hanlon,
36 N.Y.2d at 556, 330 N.E.2d at 635, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 681-82. Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969) affirmed the Aguilar requirements, id. at 415 (1969), but modified the "basis
of knowledge" prong to permit a self-verifying detail analysis. Id. at 416. The informant's
tip must describe the suspect's "criminal activity in sufficient detail [so] that the magistrate
may know ..- he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor ... or an

accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation." Id. The intricacies of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test, its abandonment and the New York requirements are discussed in
detail herein. See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
5The exclusionary rule and the criminal defendant's motion to suppress are discussed
herein. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
1 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (instituted "totality of the circumstances" approach to determine probable cause); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732
(1984) (employed Gates standard); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)
(adopted "good-faith" exception to exclusionary rule); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S.
981, 987-88 (1984) (applied Leon exception); infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
8 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985).
9 See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624; Bigelow,
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In Johnson, the defendant was arrested without a warrant for
the felony-murder of a storeowner. 10 The arrest was based solely
upon the allegations of a hearsay informant." After the defendant
was taken into custody and read his Miranda rights, he confessed
to the crime.' 2 In Bigelow, the defendant was arrested without a
warrant for criminal possession of a controlled substance subsequent to a police investigation and corroboration by a hearsay informant. 3 The defendant was taken into custody and his vehicle
impounded.' 4 Thereafter, a search warrant was issued authorizing
a search of defendant's person and automobile for cocaine. 15 Police
investigators uncovered amphetamines, hypodermic needles and
cash. "'6 In both Johnson and Bigelow, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence-the inculpating statements and the contraband, respectively-but each suppression court found probable
cause for the police action and denied the motion.' In each case,
the defendant was convicted. 8 The Appellate Division reversed the
66 N.Y.2d at 422-23, 488 N.E.2d at 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
10Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 400, 488 N.E.2d at 441, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
11Id. at 400-02, 488 N.E.2d at 441-42, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21. Soon after the homicide,
Joseph Di Prospro told police interrogating him on an unrelated charge that Bolivar Abreu
shot the storeowner. Id. at 401, 488 N.E.2d at 441, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 620. Upon questioning
by a detective, Abreu implicated Di Prospro and defendant in the crime by recounting a
conversation between the two wherein the shooting was discussed. Abreu asserted that he,
Di Prospro and defendant exchanged a rifle for a .38 caliber revolver presumably used in the
crime, and identified other robberies committed by Di Prospro and the defendant. Id. The
detective then arrested defendant solely upon Abreu's statement without corroboration or
identification by others. Id. at 401-02, 488 N.E.2d at 442, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
12 Id. at 402, 488 N.E.2d at 442, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
1 Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 421-22, 488 N.E.2d at 453, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633. In the course
of investigating drug trafficking in western New York, the police learned that defendant had
wired a large sum of money to a Florida area "known for drug activity," received two packages and mail from Florida in two rented post-office boxes and frequented the apartment of
Sutz, a known drug user and part-time drug dealer. Id. at 421, 488 N.E.2d at 453-54, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 632-33. These observations led police to suspect defendant of narcotics trafficking. Id., 488 N.E.2d at 454, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633. On the day of his arrest, police observed
defendant retrieve a package from the post office and then enter the Sutz apartment. Id.
While the Sutz apartment was surveyed, an informant was contacted who alleged that the
defendant was a "drugger" from Florida who dealt in cocaine and had conducted recent
drug transactions. Id.
14 Id. at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 454, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
15 Id. After the defendant was taken into custody, a county judge arrived at the police
station, examined the officer in camera, although he did not interview the informant, and
issued the search warrant. Id.
16 Id.
17 Johnson,

66 N.Y.2d at 402, 488 N.E.2d at 442, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 621; Bigelow, 66
N.Y.2d at 420, 488 N.E.2d at 453, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
18 Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 400, 488 N.E.2d at 453, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 620; Bigelow, 66
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judgment of conviction in Bigelow and granted the motion to suppress the evidence;19 in Johnson, however, the judgment was affirmed without opinion.2 0
In Johnson and Bigelow, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that probable cause for the police action was not demonstrated and consequently the evidence should have been suppressed. 21 Writing for the court, Judge Simons aligned the two
cases according to their hearsay emphasis, but distinguished the
analyses upon the presence of a warrant.2 2 In Johnson, Judge
Simons held that, in a warrantless arrest or search, the rule recently adopted by the Supreme Court to determine probable cause
based upon hearsay information, the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test,28 was inapplicable as a matter of state constitutional
law.24 Although Bigelow involved a search warrant, Judge Simons
refrained from adopting Gates in that particular factual setting
since the most minimal indicia of probable cause under any standard was lacking. 25 Consequently, in both Johnson and Bigelow,
the court applied the stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test, rejected by
the Supreme Court, 26 to determine that the reliability of the informant and the factual basis of the information were not demonstrated and probable cause did not exist. "7 The evidence in Bigelow
N.Y.2d at 420, 488 N.E.2d at 453, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
19 People v. Bigelow, 105 App. Div. 2d 1110, 1110-11, 482 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (4th
Dep't
1984). The Appellate Division determined that under the Aguilar-Spinelli test the informant's "basis of knowledge" was not demonstrated and the evidence should have been suppressed. Id. at 1111, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
20 People v. Johnson, 105 App. Div. 2d 1165, 483 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dep't 1985).
21 See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 400, 488 N.E.2d at 441, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 620; Bigelow, 66
N.Y.2d at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
22 See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 402-05, 488 N.E.2d at 442-44, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 621-23;
Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 423-25, 488 N.E.2d at 455-56, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35. Although Johnson and Bigelow resulted in implementation of the Aguilar-Spinelli test to determine the
probativeness of the hearsay information, the similarity of analysis ended in Johnson when
the legality of warrantless police conduct was assessed under more severe standards than
those required for conduct pursuant to a warrant. Compare Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 405-07,
488 N.E.2d at 444-46, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 623-25 ("totality of circumstances" rule established
in Gates does not apply to warrantless arrests) with Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 423-25, 488
N.E.2d at 456-57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35 (no need to apply Gates rule in testing search
warrant).
22 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
24 See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
25 See Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 425, 488 N.E.2d at 456, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
26 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (Aguilar-Spinellitwo prong test rejected in favor of "totality of circumstances" test); infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
27 See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 405-07, 488 N.E.2d at 444-46, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 623-25;
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was ordered suppressed despite the People's contention that the
contraband should have been admitted pursuant to the Supreme
Court's "good-faith" exception rule of United States v. Leon.2"
Under the auspices of the New York State Constitution, Judge
Simons declined to apply Leon since the purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of police misconduct-was subserved under
the Bigelow facts.2
It is submitted that the Johnson and Bigelow decisions are
not a barrier to implementation of the federal standards determining probable cause and exclusion from evidence when the police
act lawfully and pursuant to a warrant. The New York Court of
Appeals has the discretion to interpret the state constitution's provisions against unreasonable search and seizure differently from
the interpretation of the fourth amendment given by the Supreme
Court.30 Indeed, in Johnson, the court held that under the New
York State Constitution, when police do not obtain a warrant,
probable cause based upon hearsay must be assessed according to
Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 422, 424-26, 488 N.E.2d at 454-55, 456-57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34,
635-36.
In Johnson, the court addressed a subsidiary issue: whether the taint of the illegal arrest was so attenuated as to enable the defendant's confessions to be admitted into evidence. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 407-08, 488 N.E.2d at 446, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The court
concluded that no intervening events broke the causal connection between the illegal arrest
and the defendant's confessions and the statements had to be suppressed. Id. See also People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129, 138, 250 N.E.2d 323, 328, 303 N.Y.S.2d 33, 40-41 (1969)
(immediate link between incriminating statements and illegal police action making suppression appropriate).
28468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984); see also Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 426-27, 488 N.E.2d at
457-58, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37 (setting forth "good faith" exception).
20 Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 427, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637. In Johnson,
Judge Titone wrote a separate concurrence stressing that the exclusionary rule is a judicial
remedy and not a constitutional mandate. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 408, 488 N.E.2d at 446,
497 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (Titone, J., concurring). Judge Titone agreed, however, that suppression was appropriate since a warrant was not obtained for the arrest. Id. at 415-16, 488
N.E.2d at 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
30 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Within the parameters of its constitution, a
state may "impose greater restrictions on police activity than those... [the Supreme] Court
holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Id. at 719. To the same effect
are People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982)
and Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 78-79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1193-94, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980). Justice Brennan has noted that the protections
afforded citizens under the state constitutions often surpass those of the federal constitution
as interpreted, thereby guaranteeing "the full realization of our liberties." See Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. R.v. 489, 491
(1977).
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the stringent Aguilar-Spinelli rules.3 1 However, in Bigelow, the
court was not as resolute. Conceivably, by not affirmatively rejecting the less stringent Gates analysis when police act pursuant
to a warrant,32 the court is implying that it will follow a policy of
uniformity with the federal judiciary3 3 in the interpretation of constitutional issues involving search and seizure. Similarly, Bigelow
does not prevent implementation of a Leon "good-faith" exception
to suppression of illegally obtained evidence when the facts of the
particular case evidence "legal" police behavior. 4
Soon after the Supreme Court decided that hearsay information could form the basis for probable cause, lower courts addressing the issue of probable cause were required to determine if a
"substantial basis for crediting the hearsay" existed.3 5 The Aguilar-Spinelli test evolved as a necessary vehicle for proving the reliability and trustworthiness of the hearsay information. 8 Since its
31 See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 444-45, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624. In his
concurrence, Judge Titone noted, however, that since the Supreme Court had not addressed
the applicability of Gates and Leon to warrantless seizures, the Court of Appeals would
follow a policy of deference to federal law. Id. at 415, 488 N.E.2d at 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 630
(Titone, J., concurring).
32 See Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 424-25, 488 N.E.2d at 456, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The court
concluded that "[tihere is no reason for us to adopt ... [Gates] in testing this search warrant because the People's evidence would not meet minimum standards of probable cause
even if Gates was applied." Id. at 425, 488 N.E.2d at 456, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
3 See People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59
(1981). The identical language contained in section 12 of article I of the New York State
Constitution and the fourth amendment supports a policy of uniformity with federal standards in search and seizure interpretation. Id. It has been averred that to construe section
12 of article I differently from or as providing greater protection for the criminal defendant
than that offered by the federal constitution, the plain language of our state constitution
must provide for it. See Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 56-57, 432 N.E.2d at 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
But see infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text wherein the Court of Appeals diverged
from the Supreme Court analysis.
34 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
35See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960). Therein, the Supreme Court
determined that hearsay alone may form the basis for a finding of probable cause sufficient
to uphold a search warrant if there was adequate reason to believe the hearsay. Id. at 26971. In Jones, the magistrate was justified in the determination of probable cause since, in
the warrant application, the informant gave specific locations of the defendant's heroin supply and admitted to purchasing drugs from the defendant, id. at 267 n.2, the informant had
provided accurate information in the past, id. at 268-69, the present information was verified by other sources, id., and the defendant had admitted to using narcotics. Id. at 269. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of hearsay as a basis for probable
cause.
36 See supra note 4. By applying the Aguilar-Spinellitest to a warrant, "a Magistrate
would be assured that the source was reliable, and could judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on thereby determining the probable accuracy of the information and
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adoption by the Supreme Court, New York has followed
the two
37
prong Aguilar-Spinelli analysis to evaluate hearsay.
Within the first "veracity" prong, the reviewing judge must be
assured that the informant providing the hearsay tip was credible
or that the information itself was reliable.38 In New York, following
the federal court analysis, this requirement is satisfied when the
informant has given reliable and accurate information in the past,
leading to conviction,39 made a declaration against penal interest,40
the information was independently corroborated by police investigation 4 1 or was given under oath.4 2 Under the second prong, the
of the soundness of the logical deductions drawn from that information." People v. Hanlon,
36 N.Y.2d 549, 556, 330 N.E.2d 631, 635, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682 (1975).
In Aguilar, a search warrant was issued solely upon the following information contained
in the police officers' affidavit: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible
person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics... are being
kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964). The Court determined that the
informant's mere conclusions, as contained in the affidavit, could not allow a magistrate to
"'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on ...to show probable cause.'"
Id. at 114 (quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958)). Since the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause, the search warrant
should not have issued. Id. at 115.
37 See People v. Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d 725, 726-27, 465 N.E.2d 354, 355, 476 N.Y.S.2d
815, 816 (1984); People v. Rodriguez, 52 N.Y.2d 483, 488-91, 420 N.E.2d 946, 949-51, 438
N.Y.S.2d 754, 757-59 (1981); People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 234-39, 406 N.E.2d 471, 47274, 476, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657-60 (1980).
11 See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d at 556, 330 N.E.2d at 635, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 681-82. The Court of Appeals has noted that there is "no one acid test of reliability ... [i]n most cases, a combination of factors, considered together, lead the court to
conclude that an informant is worthy of belief." Rodriguez, 52 N.Y.2d at 489, 420 N.E.2d at
950, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
"9See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 424 (1969) (White, J., concurring)
(fact that informant "furnished reliable information in the past ...attests to the honesty of
the informant"); Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 403, 488 N.E.2d at 442, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22
(informant's reliability implies "track record, his past performance as a supplier of information"); Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d at 557, 330 N.E.2d at 635-36, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 683 (veracity prong
utilized where informant previously supplied accurate information).
4'See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971). A declaration against penal
interest is a statement made by the informant admitting major elements of a crime. See id.
The Harris Court declared that admissions of crime "carry their own indicia of credibility."
Id. This is because the police know the informant's identity and may use the incriminating
statement against the person if the information proves false. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 404, 488
N.E.2d at 443, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 622; see Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d at 727, 465 N.E.2d at 355, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 816 (1984); People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88, 90-91, 332 N.E.2d 331, 332, 371
N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (1975); People v. Garcia, 103 App. Div. 2d 753, 754, 477 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225
(2d Dep't 1984); see generally 1 W. LA FAvE,SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3[c] (1978) (2d ed.
1987) (discussion of admissions against interest).
41See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-18; Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d at 727, 465 N.E.2d at 355, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 816; Garcia, 103 App. Div. 2d at 754, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
42 See People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337, 345, 277 N.E.2d 662, 665, 327 N.Y.S.2d 643,
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informant's "basis for the knowledge" must be elucidated, thereby
establishing that the information was not based upon "rumor...
or mere suspicion.

' 43

Within this second prong, New York has di-

verged from the Supreme Court analysis by demanding a more
stringent showing of the informant's basis of knowledge when a
warrant is not sought. 4" Apparently it is within this warrantless arrest and search situation that New York follows its own path of
protection for the criminal defendant.
It is within the dichotomy of warrant and warrantless search
and seizure that New York has "declined to interpret the State
constitutional protection ...

so narrowly. ' 45 Although the fourth

648 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
43 People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 236, 406 N.E.2d 471, 474, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658
(1980). As there is no presumption that the informant has personally observed the suspect,
"the basis of knowledge test is ... intended to weed out, as not of sufficient quality, data
received by the informant from others who have not themselves observed facts suggestive of
criminal activity." Id. at 237, 406 N.E.2d at 474-75, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 659. This prong ensures
that police action will not be authorized upon rumor or mere suspicion. See Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
"' Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d at 234-35, 406 N.E.2d at 473, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 657. The Court of
Appeals held that in a warrantless arrest or search wherein the informer has not revealed
the basis for the knowledge imparted, there must be confirmation of detailed criminal activity. Id. at 234, 406 N.E.2d at 473, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 657. Specifically, the court stated that
warrantless police action:
will be sustained only when the police observe conduct suggestive of, or directly
involving, the criminal activity about which an informant who did not indicate the
basis for his knowledge has given information to the police, or when the information furnished about the criminal activity is so detailed as to make clear that it
must have been based on personal observation of that activity.
Id. at 241, 406 N.E.2d at 477, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 662. To the extent that Spinelli and Draper
imposed a less stringent test under the fourth amendment, the court declined to interpret
section 12 of article I similarly. Id. at 235, 406 N.E.2d at 473, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 657. In a
warrant situation, Spinelli permitted self-verifying detail to satisfy the "basis" prong,
wherein the tip was so sufficiently detailed that it evidenced personal observation. Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1969). See generally Comment, supra note 3, at 30103 (stating that while the Elwell court accepted the federal rule that information can be so
detailed as to be self-verifying and thus sufficient to establish probable cause for warrantless
activity, the court rejected the Draperrule that such detail may be of innocent activity as
well as criminal).
" People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 312, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619
(1983). In Gokey, a warrantless search incident to an arrest was conducted of property
within the immediate control or "grab area" of the defendant. Id. The court noted that,
pursuant to the federal rule, a custodial arrest provides per se justification for a search of
any container within the "immediate control" of the arrestee. Id. The court declined to
follow this rule, holding on stare decisis that "[u]nder the State Constitution, an individual's right of privacy in his or her effects dictates that a warrantless search incident to arrest
be deemed unreasonable unless justified by the presence of exigent circumstances." Id. Al-
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amendment and section 12 of article I are identical in language,
New York has interpreted its constitutional provision to grant
heightened protection to the criminal defendant in a warrantless
situation. 46 Therefore, the result attained in Johnson-rejection of
a less demanding test for showing probable cause based upon hearsay-was to be expected.4 7
A different set of considerations exist when an arrest or search
is conducted pursuant to a warrant. 48 There is a marked preference
though the defendant's federal constitutional rights were not violated, under the state constitution the warrantless search was declared invalid. Id. at 312, 314, 457 N.E.2d at 724, 725,
469 N.Y.S.2d at 619, 620. See also People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 452 N.E.2d 1224,
1227, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1983) (justification for warrantless search more stringent under
New York State Constitution than fourth amendment). But see People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d
49, 56-57, 432 N.E.2d 745, 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (1982) (Gabrielli, J., concurring)
(questioning the differing interpretations of state and federal constitutions in warrantless
situation); cf. People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57,
59 (1981) (under state constitution, New York adopted federal law interpretation thus abrogating automatic standing rule to challenge warrantless search; however it constituted procedural and not substantive change in law).
46 See supra note 43. The New York Court of Appeals has stated:
We have not hesitated when we concluded that the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court fell short of adequate protection for our citizens to
rely upon the principle that that document defines the minimum level of individual rights and leaves the States free to provide greater rights for its citizens
through its Constitution, statutes or rule making authority ....
Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1193, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980). See generally W. RINGEL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ARRESTS
AND CONFESSIONS § 2.6, at 2-17 (2d ed. 1985) (history and development of exclusionary rule).
47 In addition to the different constitutional analysis employed by the New York Court
of Appeals regarding warrantless arrests and searches, the Johnson court made a policy
judgment possibly waiting for the Supreme Court to specifically address this issue and apply
the Gates standard to warrantless police action. See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 488
N.E.2d at 444-45, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 623-24.
48 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965); People v. Hanlon, 36
N.Y.2d 549, 558, 330 N.E.2d 631, 636-37, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 684 (1975). "Where a search
warrant has been secured, the bona fides of the police will be presumed and the subsequent
search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case." Id. at 558, 330 N.E.2d at 637, 369 N.Y.S.2d at
684. This presumption ensues from the judiciary's preference for resort to a magistrate's
disinterested determination of probable cause. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11
(1964); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90,
92, 341 N.E.2d 227, 229, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662-63 (1975). The "preference for warrants
bespeaks an aversion to the existence of unchecked and unlimited power in the hands of
those employed to enforce laws. However, where a search warrant has been obtained the
dangers of unbridled power are minimized." Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d at 559-60, 330 N.E.2d at
637, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 685. See also People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 242, 406 N.E.2d 471, 478,
428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 662 (1980) (to satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong a magistrate may
utilize observation of confirmed noncriminal detail, but in warrantless situation the determination of probable cause is much more demanding).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:770

for warrants 49 and courts often engage in a lessened scrutiny of
probable cause when reviewing a search or arrest authorized by a
warrant. 50 Warrants enable "a neutral and detached magistrate" to
determine, meditatively and before unnecessary police intrusion,
the existence of probable cause rather than delegating this responsibility to a law enforcement officer engaged in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."5' 1 The Supreme Court recently reinforced this preference in Illinois v. Gates,52 holding that
whether hearsay information constitutes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is a determination to be made by the magistrate considering the "totality of the circumstances. '53 The Supreme Court abandoned the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test 54 in
favor of this more flexible and deferential standard that utilizes
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" prongs as well as any
55
other variables bearing on the probativeness of the information.
" See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 415, 488 N.E.2d
at 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 630; Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d at 558, 330 N.E.2d at 637, 369 N.Y.S.2d at
684.
50 See Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 424 n.*, 488 N.E.2d at 456 n.*, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.*
(1985).
" See supra note 46.
82 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates, the police received an anonymous letter implicating
the defendants in drug trafficking between Florida and Illinois. Id. at 225. Independent police observation corroborated specifics contained in the letter. Id. at 226. A search warrant
issued based upon the anonymous letter and police investigation. Id.
"' Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. The Court stated that the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not
consist of independent requirements but rather "closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there is 'probable cause.'" Id.
" Id. at 238. The Court believed that the new approach would facilitate accomodation
of the competing public and private interests under the fourth amendment. Id. at 239.
Judge Jasen, dissenting in Elwell, admonished a "rigid rule of uniform application" as the
determination of probable cause based upon hearsay is not a "static concept." See People v.
Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 246, 406 N.E.2d 471, 480, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 665 (1980).
"' Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. In discussing its new approach to probable cause the Court
observed that informants' tips vary in probativeness and "[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to
an area of such diversity." Id. at 232. Pursuant to the "totality of circumstances" analysis, a
deficiency in the basis of knowledge prong may be compensated for by a very reliable informant. See id. at 232-33. Decisions in New York courts have indicated that certain informants are "better" than others, allowing for a near presumption of reliability. Compare
People v. Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d 725, 726, 465 N.E.2d 354, 355, 476 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816
(1984) (citizen informant coming forward voluntarily allows reasonable inference of trustworthiness) with People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 226, 352 N.E.2d 562, 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375,
387 (1976)(anonymous tips inherently "devoid of reliability" thus necessitating further police action before intrusion permissible). The logic of the Gates standard is demonstrated
when two informants are presented, one an identified citizen and the other anonymous. Although the identified citizen is presumed to be reliable, both that person and the anonymous informant will be rejected under the Aguilar-Spinelli test if the basis of knowledge is
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Subsequent to the Gates decision, lower New York courts have
been uncertain of which hearsay standard to use, usually employing both.56 The Court of Appeals, declining to consider the effect of
Gates on a previous occasion, 57 has utilized the "totality of the circumstances" language before in its assessment of hearsay information, probable cause and warrants.58
Due to the court's policy of uniformity with the federal interpretation of search and seizure law, 59 and its historical treatment
of hearsay and warrants, ° it appears that the Gates rationale has
been adopted sub silentio in a warrant situation. Therefore, until
the state constitution is interpreted so as to definitively adopt or
not averred in the affidavit in consideration of probable cause.
In Bigelow, the Court of Appeals analyzed the facts under the Gates analysis and concluded that the failure to demonstrate the informant's basis of knowledge was not off-set by
a showing of reliability. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 426, 488 N.E.2d at 457, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
The informant had only given information to the police leading to one arrest which resulted
in an acquittal. Id. Although the informant was already at the police station, the magistrate
did not examine him. Id. at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 454, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633. It has been held
that when the magistrate knew who the informer was and how the information was acquired, the reliability of the information was certain. See People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90, 93,
341 N.E.2d 227, 230, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 664 (1975). If the magistrate had conducted an examination of the informant, the Gates analysis would have yielded a finding of probable
cause. See People v. Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 183, 187, 352 N.E.2d 545, 547-48, 386 N.Y.S.2d 359,
361 (1976); People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 181, 313 N.E.2d 49, 52, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 58586 (1974).
11 See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 95 App. Div. 2d 241, 251, 465 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1005 (2d Dep't
1983) (unnecessary to consider which standard to use since under either test informant's tip
proved reliable); People v. Acevedo, 128 Misc. 2d 405, 410, 488 N.Y.S.2d 537 541 (Sup. Ct.
Crim. T. Kings County 1985)(same); People v. Mingo, 125 Misc. 2d 373, 377 n.*, 479
N.Y.S.2d 669, 672 n.* (Sup. Ct. Crim. T. N.Y. County 1984)(same).
'7 See People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 375 n.*, 452 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 n.*, 465
N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 n.* (1983). The court employed an alternative analysis, disregarding the
hearsay information, to determine that probable cause existed for the arrest and subsequent
search. Id. at 376, 452 N.E.2d at 1188-89, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
" See, e.g., People v. Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d 130, 136, 359 N.E.2d 666, 670, 391
N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1976). Therein the court noted that if one of the following items were
present-hearsay information without specification of source, independent police corroboration or criminal reputation of defendant-no probable cause would exist; yet, in a given case
the totality of circumstances might support a finding of probable cause. Id. In Wirchansky,
however, the crucial element was the police observation and since it could be interpreted as
innocent activity, the tip and defendant's reputation did not elevate the activity to a finding
of probable cause. Id. The finding in Bigelow was extremely similar. See Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d
at 424, 488 N.E.2d at 456, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 635; supra notes 13-15. See also People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 559, 330 N.E.2d 631, 637, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 685 (1975)(magistrate
should consider all aspects of information supporting the application to determine probable
cause).
See supra notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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reject a Gates analysis for all probable cause determinations, it is
submitted that the less stringent federal approach may be used on
a case-by-case basis when the factual scenario entails lawful police
6 1
conduct.
Another issue that remains largely unresolved after Bigelow is
the extent to which evidence illegally obtained may nevertheless be
admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief at the criminal trial.2
The exclusionary rule, a judicially created remedy,6 3 was adopted
to guarantee the private citizen's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.6 4 It permits the court to exclude the fruits of
unconstitutional activity from the evidence admitted in criminal
proceedings," thereby ensuring that the main purpose of the exclusionary rule will be upheld: deterrence of future unlawful police
conduct."'
The exclusionary rule does not mandate the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence since the right to exclusion of such evidence is not a constitutional right.6 7 Rather, New York has ac8" The Wirchansky case espoused this conclusion, wherein a Gates approach was considered. See Wirchansky, 41 N.Y.2d at 136, 359 N.E.2d at 670, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 75; supra
note 56. The crucial element in Wirchansky was police observation (as in Bigelow) and the
court asserted that if the informant's tip did not disclose criminal activity, the police themselves must provide underlying circumstances from which the magistrate could decide illegal
activity was present. Id. at 135, 359 N.E.2d at 670, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 74. Police action of this
sort was not present in Bigelow.
82 See Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 426-27, 488 N.E.2d at 457-58, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
"s See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The exclusionary rule is a
"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. Accord People v. Young, 55 N.Y.2d 419, 425, 434 N.E.2d 1068, 1071, 449
N.Y.S.2d 701, 704, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848 (1982); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 422
N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981). See generally
Glady, The Exclusionary Rule, 71 GEo. L.J. 434 (1982) (discussing purpose and scope of
exclusionary rule).
84 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (1974).
5 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,

393-94 (1914).
"8 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976). "'The [exclusionary] rule is calculated
to prevent, not to repair.'" Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
Its primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct. See id.; People v. Young, 55
N.Y.2d 419, 424, 434 N.E.2d 1068, 1071, 449 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (1982).
87 People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 356, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (1903), aff'd, 192 U.S. 585
(1904). In Adams, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the state
constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures created an exclusionary
rule. See id. at 358-59, 68 N.E. at 639-40. The Adams court held that in a criminal case it
will "not take notice how... [the evidence was] obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully,
nor will it frame issues to determine that question." Id. at 357, 68 N.E. at 638 (citation
omitted).
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cepted the Supreme Court's rationale by invoking the rule only
when its "remedial objectives are most 'efficaciously served' and
not merely 'tenuously demonstrable.' "68
In Bigelow, the People asserted in the alternative that if the
probable cause for the search was not demonstrated, the contraband could still be admitted pursuant to the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.6 9 This modification of the exclusionary rule was accepted in United States v. Leon, 0 which permitted
illegally obtained evidence to be admitted if the police acted objectively in good faith by relying upon the search warrant. 7 1 In BigeAdams was followed in People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13 (1926), wherein Judge Cardozo
refused to suppress evidence based upon the New York Civil Rights Law, section 8 (the
predecessor of article I, section 12). Id. at 17-19.
In 1938 the New York State Constitution was amended by the addition of article I,
section 12. See People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 166-68, 51 N.E.2d 690, 69293 (1943). The court noted that since the statute interpreted in Defore was incorporated
into the constitution verbatim, the rule admitting evidence would be given like effect. Id. at
168, 51 N.E.2d at 693. See also Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 408-11, 488 N.E.2d at 446-48, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 625-27 (Titone, J., concurring) (above mentioned cases evidenced that exclusionary rule not a constitutional mandate).
"3Young, 55 N.Y.2d at 425, 434 N.E.2d at 1071, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (quoting respectively Calandra,414 U.S. at 348, and People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 385 N.E.2d 541,
544, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979)).
In 1961, the exclusionary rule was extended to state prosecutions. See Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). In 1962, section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted
"to provide an orderly procedure for the application of the exclusionary rule." People v.
Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 469, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879, 882 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962).
Article 710 of the Criminal Procedure Law codifies the exclusionary rule by permitting
a motion to suppress evidence. See N.Y. CraM.PROC. LAW § 710.20 (McKinney 1984). At the
suppression hearing the People have the burden of going forward to establish the legality of
the challenged conduct but the defendant has the ultimate burden of proving the illegality.
See People v. Petralia, 62 N.Y.2d 47, 52, 464 N.E.2d 424, 426, 476 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 96, 204, N.E.2d 188, 195, 255
N.Y.S.2d 850, 860 (1965). See generally H.B. ROTHBLATT, CRIMINAL LAW OF NEW YORK §§
595-604 (1971 & Supp. 1985) (procedural aspects of motion to suppress evidence).
11 See Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 454-55, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34.
70 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
"' Id. at 913. Justice White, writing for the Court, declared that the exclusionary rule is
invoked as a remedy to deter future unlawful police conduct. Id at 906. Therefore courts
should decide whether to apply the rule by balancing the deterrent benefit of exclusion on
police misconduct against the societal costs of excluding such evidence. Id. at 906-07.
Although the Supreme Court modified the exclusionary rule in Leon, the New York
Court of Appeals has recognized that the rule should be applied where its primary purpose-deterrence of police misconduct-would be furthered. See People v. Adams, 53
N.Y.2d 1, 9, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981); People v. McGrath, 46
N.Y.2d 12, 21, 385 N.E.2d 541, 544, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972
(1979). Therein, it was observed: "[e]mploying a balancing approach, the court has declined
to apply the exclusionary rule in those areas where the ultimate effectuation of its remedial
objectives is only tenuously demonstrable." Id. For a general discussion of Leon, see Bloom,
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low, the court concluded that if the illegally seized contraband was
to be admitted, "the exclusionary rule's purpose . . . [would be]

completely frustrated," and thus held the exception to be inapplicable. 2 In reaching this determination the Bigelow court did not
consider the good faith of the police"7 but rather implicated a balancing approach in deciding whether the exception should apply.7 4
This approach, akin to the analysis used by the Supreme Court in
Leon,75 signals the possibility that in a subsequent case the evaluation of the societal costs and deterrent benefits of the exclusionary
rule may lead to application of the exception. Peculiar to the Bigelow facts, the deterrent benefits outweighed any costs to society by
76
excluding the evidence.

In Bigelow and Johnson the New York Court of Appeals had
its first opportunity77 to set the state law precedent in the determination of probable cause and exclusion of evidence in light of recent federal law modifications. Johnson explicitly rejected any attempts to dilute the requisite findings for probable cause based
upon hearsay pursuant to a warrantless arrest. 78 Bigelow, however,

leaves this area of law in a great degree of uncertainty. It is submitted that Bigelow should be viewed as a provisional decision, peculiar to its fact pattern, wherein an explicit rejection or acceptance of the Gates/Leon standards will have to await a case
involving less "illegal police action and . . . lawless acts. '7 9 With
increased police lawfulness, the effect of the federal rules can be
vigorously tested. Until a "bright-line" rule of law is implemented
in situations involving lawful police conduct, it is further submitUnited States v. Leon and its Ramifications, 56 U. COLo. L. REv. 247 (1985); Wasserstrom &
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold. But Was it a Fair Trial?,22 AM. Cam. L.
REv. 85 (1984).
7 Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 427, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637. Specifically the
court determined that admission of the contraband would place a premium on the illegal
police action and encourage future lawless acts by others. Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 426, 488 N.E.2d at 457, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 436. It should be noted that even
though the court in Bigelow did not adopt Leon, the New York Court of Appeals has applied Leon's rationale before. See, e.g., People v. Young, 55 N.Y.2d 419, 425, 434 N.E.2d
1068, 1071, 449 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (1982)(application of exclusionary rule is dependent
"'upon balancing of its probable deterrent effect against its detrimental impact'") (quoting
People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 385 N.E.2d 541, 544, 412 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (1978)).
11 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70.
77See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
78See Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
7'

7

Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 427, 488 N.E.2d at 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
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ted that lower courts may review probable cause and suppression
determinations upon the facts and circumstances of each case using the federal rules for guidance. Interpretation of our state constitution and the policy of uniformity with the federal judiciary in
search and seizure law supports such a result.
Merryl Hoffman

